The Club!

Ye sure that was obvious. It surely did add large impact of bad decision due to that, one of leaders died directly due due to that.

In his book "Into thin air", Krakauer wrote:

.....
After a few steps, I paused to take another photo, this one looking down the Southeast
Ridge, the route we had climbed. Then I saw something that until that moment had
escaped my attention. To the south, where the sky had been perfectly clear just an hour
earlier, a blanket of clouds now hid the peaks of the other smaller mountains surrounding
Mount Everest.

Days later—after six bodies had been found, and after surgeons had amputated the
right hand of my teammate Beck Weathers—people would ask why, if the weather had
begun to get worse, had climbers on the upper mountain not seen the signs of coming
disaster? Why did experienced Himalayan guides keep moving upward, leading a group
of amateurs, each of whom had paid as much as $65,000 to be taken safely up Everest,
into an apparent death trap?


I couldn’t think about these things now. I needed to get down fast.

It was after 2:30 PM when I made it down to the South Summit. By now, mist was
wrapping across the top of Mount Everest’s sister peak, 27,000-foot Lhotse, and fog was
lapping at the lower part of Everest's summit pyramid. No longer did the weather look so
good. I grabbed a fresh oxygen cylinder and hurried down into the cloud. Moments after
I dropped below the South Summit, it began to snow lightly and the visibility went to
hell.

Four hundred feet above, where the summit was still washed in bright sunlight under a
blue sky, my “compadres” were wasting time, celebrating their arrival at the top of the

3

planet with photos and high-fives, all the while using up precious ticks of the clock.
None of them imagined that a horrible ordeal was drawing near. None of them suspected
that by the end of that long day, every minute would matter.

How had these minimally qualified climbers gotten themselves into this mess? As a
matter of fact, how had I?


About Adams (the Pilot) he wrote:

About twenty yards below the summit I passed Neal Beidleman and a client of
Fischer's named Martin Adams on their way up. After exchanging a high five with Neal, I grabbed
a handful of small stones from a wind-scoured patch of exposed shale, zipped the souvenirs into
the pocket of my down suit, and hastened down the ridge. A moment earlier I'd noticed that
wispy clouds now filled the valleys to the south, obscuring all but the highest peaks. Adams-a
small, Pugnacious Texan who'd gotten rich selling bonds during the boomIng 1980s-is an
experienced airplane pilot who'd spent many hours gazing down on the tops of clouds; later he
told me that he recognized these innocent-looking puffs of water vapor to be the crowns of
robust thunderheads immediately after reaching the top. "When you see
_k
a thunderhead in an airplane," he explained, "your first reaction is to get the fuck out of
there. So that's what I did." But unlike Adams, I was unaccustomed to peering down at

cumulonimbus cells from 29,000 feet, and I therefore remained ignorant of the storm that was
even then bearing down. My concerns revolved round the diminishing supply of oxygen in my
tank.



From that, it is questionable, that Adams talked to either to Bukrejew or Krakauer about the weather phenomenon near the peak. Now I am under the impression, that Adams and Krakauer talked very much later about it.


Now, that is interesting:

In fact, the only people to reach the summit before 2:00 P.M. were Boukreev, Harris, Beidleman, Adams,
Schoening, and me; if Fischer and Hall had been true to their prearranged rules, everyone else
would have turned back before the top. Despite Beidleman's growing anxiety about the
advancing clock, he didn't have a radio, so there was no way to discuss the situation with Fischer


So radio use was not so common in these days. That explains a lot......

Then again the question: Adams (the Pilot) was aware of the fast changing weather condition when ascending, seems to not have warned anyone at the way up. Seems, he was willing to pay the price for the summit at all costs.

Question then is: since he was one of the first to reach the top, the deal was done for him. On the way back he could have warned the still ascending climbers.

Have to investigate Adams more closely

oh my - wikipedia has it all LOL

Analysis

The disaster was partially caused by the sheer number of climbers attempting to ascend (34 climbers on 10 May 1996). The congestion of the crowd, combined with delays in securing ropes, caused bottlenecks at the Hillary Step and the Balcony and delayed the ascent of many climbers. Therefore, many summitted after the safe 14:00 turnaround time.

Jon Krakauer has suggested that the use of bottled oxygen and commercial guides, who personally accompanied and took care of all pathmaking, equipment, and important decisions, allowed otherwise unqualified climbers to attempt to summit, leading to dangerous situations and more deaths.[27] In addition, he wrote that the competition between Hall and Fischer's guiding companies may have led to Hall's decision not to turn back on 10 May after the pre-decided time for summiting of 14:00; Krakauer also acknowledges that his own presence as a journalist for an important magazine for mountaineers may have added pressure to guide clients to the summit despite growing dangers.[28] He proposed banning bottled oxygen except for emergency cases, arguing that this would both decrease the growing pollution on Everest—many discarded bottles have accumulated on its slopes—and keep marginally qualified climbers off the mountain. He does point out, however, that climbing Everest has always been a highly dangerous endeavour even before the guided tours, with one fatality for every four climbers who reach the summit. Furthermore, he notes that many of the poor decisions made on 10 May were after two or more days of inadequate oxygen, nourishment, and rest (due to the effects of entering the death zone above 8,000 m/26,000 ft). He concludes that decisions made in such circumstances should not be strongly criticized by the general population, who have not experienced such conditions.[29]

Krakauer also elaborated on the statistical curiosities of fatality rates on Everest and how 1996 was "business as usual". The record number of 12 fatalities in the spring climbing season that year was 3% of the 398 climbers who had ascended above Base Camp—slightly below the historical average of 3.3% at that time. Additionally, 12 climbers had died that season, and 84 had reached the summit. This is a ratio of 1 in 7—significantly less than the historical average prior to 1996 of 1 in 4. Since the fatality rates on Everest have dropped considerably, accounting for the volume of climbers in 1996 compared to prior years, 1996 was statistically a safer-than-average year.[30]

In May 2004, Kent Moore, a physicist, and John L. Semple, a surgeon, both researchers from the University of Toronto, told New Scientist magazine that an analysis of weather conditions on 11 May suggested that freak weather caused oxygen levels to plunge by around 14%.[31][32]


And from the German Wikipedia site (google translated, so sorry for some bad translations)

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ungl%C...est_%281996%29

analysis

An analysis of the main reasons that led to the disaster shows:

In both commercial expeditions climbers who had no experience with high altitudes were. These mountaineers were dependent barely able to make their own informed decisions, and thus of their guides. The failure of some mountain guides vulnerable customers in addition; For example, the rapid solo descent of Anatoli Bukrejew or late reversal time from Rob Hall and Scott Fischer were criticized. Jon Krakauer also describes the guide-client relationship as problematic as it to a customer, even if they were experienced mountaineer, brought to his view, to place undue reliance on the mountain guide. Secondly, put the problematic relationship, according to Krakauer mountain guides under pressure to bring as many customers to the summit and for ignoring certain signs of danger.

It was on May 10, a large number of climbers on the summit day on the road. In addition, the members of the commercial expeditions were instructed to stay together. In this way was a large group with relatively small distances from the road, causing congestion at key points, especially at the Hillary Step. This delayed the rise of most climbers such an extent that many of them only after the usual reversal time from 14:00 clock reached the summit. Thus, the time was to descend in the daylight just as well no longer sufficient oxygen supplies some climbers.

Jon Krakauer and some famous mountaineers (z. B. Reinhold Messner, Edmund Hillary or Ralf Dujmovits [10]) criticize the practice to let ascend customers with the support of additional oxygen. They argue that the extra oxygen will help climbers who would not make the climb without this support and possibly get into trouble once the oxygen stocks are exhausted or if the oxygen devices fail again. Krakauer suggested allowing oxygen support only for emergencies and otherwise to refrain completely from the use. This proposed practice would also automatically reduce the number of climbers on Everest (and other 8000ern) and reduce the problem of pollution from abandoned empty oxygen cylinders high on the mountain. In an interview on the events said the German mountaineer and organizer of commercial expeditions Ralf Dujmovits he renounce since 1996 on helping commercial expeditions to the high 8000 as Everest, Lhotse and K2. He said the risk in the high altitudes was for him not portable, as a mountain guide "... you go up there at the stop. We can not deliver clean work more at this level. And if I can no longer guarantee the safety of people, I have to just leave it alone. "[10]

The change in the weather in the afternoon played a more important role. The timing of the storm was very bad: Many climbers were already on the summit or the summit ridge and had already used up a large part of their forces. An earlier storm had forced the climbers sooner and with greater power reserves to repentance; so that the likelihood of survival would have been higher.

In 1996, the commercial expeditions lower experiences on Everest expeditions with amateur mountaineers as for example, ten years later. 1996, there were 15 deaths on 98 summit ascents. For part of the year 2006, the rate on the other hand in 11 deaths was about 400 mountain climbing. The vendors have learned: mountain guides now have a better understanding than in 1996 for what their customers need equipment, oxygen, help the Sherpas and Fixleinen. They collect weather data, keeping material for the rescue and care of injured clients ready and spend a long time to adapt their strategies to the realities summit. [8th]

Problems made 1996 the small number of professionals in relation to customers. The attendance rate for customers by Sherpas is today in large commercial operators in the summit day is often 1: 1, each paying customer is thus accompanied by a Sherpa. This allows a power individual climbing gear - it was a point of criticism Krakauers to have been slowed by the requirement Rob Halls that the group had to stay together for the sake of the overview and safety. The same reason the cost is not the peak reached Beck Wheathers his health - he had when he got vision problems, can descend with individual care, rather than at the behest of the Halls Summit return the other to wait. Today, the communication is better because each team member can have radio.
In May 2004, the physicist Ken Moore published together with the physicians John L. Semple in New Scientist Magazine, an analysis of the weather conditions of the 11th May 1996 and showed that high wind speeds (by the action of hydrodynamic pressure) the air pressure and therefore the oxygen partial pressure reduce. At the material time, the effect described could have lowered the oxygen partial pressure of up to 6%. [11] [12] As a result, the Mountaineers were more susceptible to altitude sickness.

I found in the book of Boukreev, that Scott Fisher had only organized old antiquated 10-channel radios, which were heavy in weight and maybe difficult to use in such circumstances. Boukreev thought, that it was a big fault to use this radios.


Interesting, isn't it?

Yeh the comercial aspect of MtE climbing is opening rather ameteurish people to join the missions which does certainly add a lot problems or deaths. One thing that still struck me from movie is the price of climb, 65k ??I mean ye sure it is one of kind things to experiance in life, and it does take large preparations and some item costs+possibly ensurance for rescue team, but still no way i can see that number go to 65k. Whats your view what makes that number so drastic?
Actually, thinking of it, perhaps it could be the year, 1996, back then there was far less expeditions, so that would made sense why such price. Its same as going into space, current prices are astronomical way above the cost of actual flight, in future theyll surely go down as things start to pick up.

also in that book:

Martin Adams said: it was not the weather that caused the problems. It was the lost time that caused the problems.

alone fees for authorization amount to around 13.000 USD

The 65k seems to be the upper price as far as I see. In the expeditions 1996 only one person paid the full price. I think more common in both commercial groups were around 50k. Now I find agencies offering the expedition for around 30k including fees.

The planned time is about 60 days.

The amount not only pays for your travel, gear, food, gas, oxygen, logistic etc, but also for the Sherpas. Nowadays it is common, that each participant has his own Sherpa.

Add to that the costs for the agencies (administration), the loan for the leader and the additional guides.

Ad to that the price for insurances.

Add to that the question, what the life of the leader, the guides and the Sherpas is worth.

Well, the price seems reasonable

Here is a German site which I translated with Google. You can see the offering, what you get for basic price (9.600€) and for full service (28950 €)

https://translate.google.de/translat...-text=&act=url

The Fed's Stunning Admission Of What Happens Next

Told ya, large gap down opened on Brent/WTI. 25 soon, ill sell some in next weeks if tech entries are there.

What Crisis Is The Gold/Oil Ratio Predicting This Time?

Hard to investigate Adams - he has barely said anything in the press at all.

Maybe he thought, when he saw the weather phenomenon, that it would be time enough for all to climb up and down

Who knows......

http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/defau...17_china10.jpg

Cant wait for April! They took Nikei index from ICM, but they cant take the JPY from me

Got some gold long in.

Actually its not predicting it its already here, and its EM crisis, EM crisis has not ended as chart shows, only began. Also note that Gold/Oil ratio never in 200 year history was able to "predict" crisis it only was able to tell when crisis was already there, as drastic Oil price changes were majority of crisis starts of petrodollar wars since 1920/pre-petrodollar and crisis before that were majority started in gold due to inflation or deflation.

Damn GBP is getting beat mad last weeks, not sure what is going on.

Zooming in on oil

edit: you could also make the case wave 5 ended at wave iii and that wave 5 or i shown would be a new wave (i) of ii of impulse wave 3 - the bearish alternate

I agree - with the current price of oil, you do need to zoom in to see it..

Nice waves - thanks.

Hi PTL,

what is cooking? Hope all is fine.

Here we go new lows on EMs. Holding large one on MXN +230 atm, added fresh on ZAR 16.88, Brent +7 atm, targeting 25. No change same story till 2017 unless emergency hikes come. 40 bucks rally today in BTC, looks good for some extended up wave.

Time to get creative... another count idea for oil, expanding diagonal 5th