



Total FX

September 2, 2016

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G10 & EMFX

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KEY TOPICS

[FX Strategy: Why FX carry may be back in fashion](#)

- Selective FX carry trades are starting to make sense again as the yield on conventional assets sinks to ever lower levels.
- Rising sensitivity to *outright yield* may go a long way in explaining why AUD has been so robust to a negative interest rate *dynamic* in 2016.
- And SEK's persistent weakness in the face of otherwise better fundamentals may reflect its status as the most efficient funder in G10 carry trades, a role filled by CAD for many years previously.
- Against high yield EM, however, shorting CAD still makes more sense than the "default" position of funding in USD.

[FX Strategy: What happens to USD if the Fed hikes in September?](#)

- A 2016 hike is increasingly consensus, with Fed fund futures pointing to a ~70% probability by year end, from close to zero two months ago. USD has benefited but remains range-bound against most currencies.
- The sensitivity of DXY to rate differentials has dropped, though it is not just a USD phenomenon (see page 2). On top of this, the beta of the slope of the forward curve to the very front end has also dropped, capping the impact of 2016 expectations on 2017 and limiting follow-through for the currency.
- So even if the Fed were to hike in September, ahead of consensus, USD gains should be limited. This week we booked the premium on our short 1.30 Cable put which expired OTM. We still like selling 1m GBP/USD downside and buying longer-dated puts.

FX Strategy: Why FX carry may be back in fashion


2 September 2016, Adam Cole

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Is carry trading back in fashion?

Is carry trading back as a viable FX strategy and a driver of FX market returns? That is a possible explanation for the robust performance of AUD in particular in 2016, despite a consistently negative interest rate *dynamic* (particularly relative to the US) as markets have priced in ever more RBA easing (Figure 1). It is plausible that, in a risk-positive environment and with yield increasingly hard to find in liquid markets (blue line in Figure 3, for example), AUD's *outright yield* is propping the currency up, irrespective of whether yields are rising or falling. In other words, carry is back as an FX market driver.

1. AUD defies negative rate expectations



The fly in the ointment for this argument is of course JPY. How can we be in a carry-driven environment when JPY is by far the best performing currency in G10 this year and is up 12% against AUD and 9% against NZD? As we argue below, using our carry trade barometer, the answer is that JPY is not an efficient funding currency for carry trades in a world with so many other low or negative yielding candidates and should never be part of the funding side of a carry trade. As Figure 2 shows, if we exclude JPY from the G10 universe, carry has been a consistently successful investment strategy for the last

year. A simple basket of long the three highest-yielding G10 currencies and short the three lowest-yielding would have been up 8% over the last year after three years of consistently negative returns.


2. Carry strategies work, ex-JPY



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Also worth noting in this context, despite consistently falling global yields, the yield on FX carry trades appears to have hit a floor and is still above post-crisis lows (Figure 3). This is a simple consequence of the removal of the zero bound in so many markets. The fact that investors are paid to short a number of G10 currencies has compensated for the decline in yields on the long side of carry trades. Although the yield on FX carry trades is not far from the lows, it has risen *relative* to the yield most other asset classes.

3. Carry trade yields seem to have troughed



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

What defines a good funding currency?

So if we accept there is a case for taking a more positive view on carry trades generally, what makes a *good* carry trade? The efficacy of FX carry trades is determined by the trade-off between the return (interest rate spread) and risk (spot volatility). Our carry trade barometer uses options prices to

objectively assess this trade-off and screen for efficient carry trades. The criterion is based on the affordability of options protection against the spot trade going wrong – lower vol and wider rate spreads both make protection more affordable and so increase the attractiveness of a currency pair as a carry trade.

Take the current arithmetic for AUD/JPY as a numerical example. The 3m interest rate spread between AUD and JPY is currently 2.4%, so an investor that goes long and holds the position for three months earns 0.60% of carry (non-annualised). Suppose, at the beginning of the three month period, the investor used all of the 0.60% to buy an AUD/JPY put option, also on a three month horizon, so insuring against an adverse spot move. At current vol levels, that much premium would buy an option on a 69.43 strike, ie 11.11% out-of-the-money relative to spot. This is our criterion of the attractiveness of the pair as carry trade. The closer to at-the-money such an option becomes, the better the trade-off between vol and spread.

4. RBC Carry Trade Barometer

		Buying downside protection in...								
vs...	AUD	NZD	BRL	CLP	MXN	TRY	ZAR	INR	IDR	
USD	8.82	8.56	3.38	4.85	8.19	3.16	8.61	1.13	2.71	
JPY	11.11	10.38	4.40	7.16	7.59	5.30	4.84	2.89	4.05	
CAD	5.37	5.37	2.77	3.86	5.14	2.70	3.24	2.24	3.90	
GBP	6.71	7.06	3.62	5.58	7.57	2.33	7.15	1.38	5.25	
EUR	5.34	5.41	3.35	4.85	6.34	2.21	6.96	1.87	4.55	
CHF	4.82	5.24	3.95	5.06	6.19	1.73	7.20	0.79	1.91	
SEK	4.15	4.46	2.97	4.50	6.77	2.64	6.83	2.69	1.96	
CZK	5.49	5.29	3.17	5.11	6.68	2.83	6.08	1.46	2.32	
Rank	AUD	NZD	BRL	CLP	MXN	TRY	ZAR	INR	IDR	
USD	7	7	5	3	8	7	8	2	4	
JPY	8	8	8	8	7	8	2	8	6	
CAD	4	4	1	1	1	5	1	6	5	
GBP	6	6	6	7	6	3	6	3	8	
EUR	3	5	4	3	3	2	5	5	7	
CHF	2	2	7	5	2	1	7	1	1	
SEK	1	1	2	2	5	4	4	7	2	
CZK	5	3	3	6	4	6	3	4	3	

Source: RBC Capital Markets

Figure 4 shows the same arithmetic for a range of potential carry trades as it looks now. The first panel is again the % out of the money a three month option is, if the three month carry is used to pay the premium. **The smaller the numbers in the table, the better the trade-off.** The second panel simply ranks the funding currencies for each high yielder, with the first and second most efficient highlighted in blue and grey.

Several key points stand out, as do a number of changes since we [last updated this table](#):

- **JPY** is by far the worst funding currency amongst the low-yielders. This is simply a consequence of the [risk on/risk off nature of FX markets](#) currently and JPY's status as a safe haven, maximizing volatility against the (typically risky) high yielders. This has been true for most of the post-crisis period and funding currency status should never have been a reason to be negative-JPY in that period.
- **SEK** has jumped up the rankings to now be the first choice funding currency in [G10 carry trades](#) (ie on the other side of AUD and NZD longs). Although it is unlikely direct positioning in these pairs has become extended, it is likely that investors using similar yield/vol optimisations in overlay strategies will have been "forced" into shorter and shorter SEK positions in aggregate. This may help explain SEK's persistent weakness, despite what are rapidly improving fundamentals, and also leave SEK vulnerable to a squeeze if carry trades start underperforming.
- SEK's rise up the G10 funding currency rankings is the counterpart to **CAD's** decline. For most of the post-crisis period, when FX/risk correlations have been high, short CAD has been by far the most efficient way to fund long positions in AUD and NZD and its slippage to fourth in both cases is a significant change that reflects CAD's now relatively high rates. In itself, this is not a reason to be bullish CAD, but it raises the hurdle for being bearish.
- **CHF** is also starting to creep up the ranking as funding currency, which may help explain its steady underperformance against most G10 currencies this year (GBP and SEK being the only exceptions).
- Against [high yield EM](#), **CAD** remains the highest ranked funding currency where commodity prices are the link. For investors with a prior positive view on BRL, MXN, CLP or ZAR, shorting CAD on the other side of long positions still brings a better vol/yield trade-off than "defaulting" to short **USD**, which generally does not work as a funding currency anywhere.
- Perhaps surprisingly, and despite significantly negative yields, **EUR** does not feature as a good funding currency (except against TRY). This may change if EUR continues to shed the status of safe haven (EUR/USD is risk neutral currently) that it had until recently and starts to trade as a risky asset again.

FX Strategy: What happens to USD if the Fed hikes in September?


2 September 2016, Elsa Lignos

- A 2016 hike is increasingly consensus, with Fed fund futures pointing to a ~70% probability by year end, from close to zero two months ago. USD has benefited but remains range-bound against most currencies.
- The sensitivity of DXY to rate differentials has dropped, though it is not just a USD phenomenon (see page 2). On top of this, the beta of the slope of the forward curve to the very front end has also dropped, capping the impact of 2016 expectations on 2017 and limiting follow-through for the currency.
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Consensus for a 2016 hike

Since early July, US rate expectations have risen significantly. In the days just after the UK referendum, markets were briefly priced for a small probability of a cut this year. Since then, two much stronger than expected payrolls reports (>250k), coupled with some 'hawkish' Fed rhetoric has seen a hike by year end now 70% priced in and the chances for September peak around 40%, though it has retraced to ~30% on a weak ISM survey. USD has benefited from the rise, though it remains range-bound. In the last two months, EUR/USD has traded a 400pt range; it is now just 30pts off the midpoint. The same is true for AUD/USD (400pt range; 20pts off the midpoint) and USD/JPY (a wider range of 800pts, but again spot is 30pts off the midpoint). GBP/USD and USD/CAD are slightly firmer than the middle of their respective ranges, but the theme of sideways USD trading is hard to shake.

1. A 2016 Fed hike is close to fully priced by markets




Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Markets have spent all year waiting for the second Fed hike. Policy is still easy or easing further across the rest of G10 so why is USD not doing better as a 2016 hike gets priced in?


This is not just a USD story. In fact, there is a more obvious breakdown between the currency and rate dynamics in other currencies (e.g. AUD). We looked into the reasons for that in the previous article (pages 2-3). Figure 2 shows how the sensitivity of DXY to interest rate differentials has fallen since late last year.¹ It is now back at pre-crisis levels (Figure 3), though back then the elasticity was lower as rate moves were considerably bigger.

2. The elasticity of DXY to rate differentials has fallen...



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

3. ...Back to pre-crisis levels




Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

¹ We look at the difference between US 2y swaps and the weighted 2y swap rate of the DXY components, then estimate the beta of daily changes in DXY to daily changes in the rate differential.

Part of the answer lies in the apparent importance of outright yield over rate dynamics discussed on pages 2-3. But there might be another factor that is more US specific. Markets, analysts and the FOMC have almost consistently over-estimated the pace of future Fed rate hikes. Two years ago, futures were priced for Fed funds at 1.5% in September 2016. This time last year, markets thought we would have reached 0.7%. Instead we are still debating the second hike. At the same time, investors have adjusted their expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate. Figure 4 shows that progressive flattening in the US forward curve.


4. Fwd curve has flattened almost consistently since 2014



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

But in recent months, the forward curve has been shifting almost in parallel. That is to say, even when expectations have risen for 2016, there has been limited follow-through for 2017. Figure 5 shows how the Fed fund futures curve has evolved over the last six months. While it steepened from March to June and flattened into early July, moves since then have been closer to parallel shifts. As markets have priced in a 2016 hike, expectations for 2017 have factored in that 2016 hike, but not risen much incrementally, i.e. a 2016 hike is taken as less of a signal for a follow-on hike in 2017. It seems markets are increasingly buying into the Fed's claim that it is data-dependent and there is no pre-set path for interest rates.

5. Recent moves are closer to parallel shifts...




Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Figure 6 shows a different way to look at this. It shows the sensitivity of the slope of the Fed funds futures curve to expectations at the very front end. Specifically it is the beta of daily changes in the difference between the 12th and 3rd generic contract to daily changes in the 3rd contract.

The sensitivity of the slope to the level of near-dated rate expectations has fallen materially over the last 18 months – in part this was down to the market building in expectations for a slower cycle and lower terminal rate. But in the last few months that beta has approached zero, indicating expectations for the next three months have had almost no incremental effect on 2017.

6. ... And changes at the very front end are not driving bigger moves further out the curve



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

In previous work on how USD responds to Fed tightening cycles, we argued that there is no standard response (see [Total FX: USD and Fed tightening](#), 7 Aug 2015). Unsurprisingly it depends on the pace of tightening and interest rate dynamics in the rest of the world. If a hike in 2016 does not lead to a material increase in rate expectations for 2017 & 2018, it limits USD's scope for gains. That is not to say USD won't react to a Fed decision to hike or not hike this year – the 70pt reaction to a weak ISM manufacturing number in both EUR/USD and USD/JPY is testament to how almost every data release is shifting expectations for the Fed and how those expectations still drive the currency. But the big difference is the *elasticity*. If that has fallen as we suspect it has, a hike (or no hike) will limit USD gains/losses to well-worn ranges.

One trade we have recommended before is selling 1m GBP/USD downside and buying a longer-dated put (see [Total FX: GBP – This is not 1992](#), 28 July 2016) for the original trade idea and rationale and this week's [Thematic Trade of the Week](#) for our short-term tactically positive GBP view. The GBP/USD vol curve remains relatively flat and we still see value in selling 1m downside, even though the FOMC meeting falls within that 1m window. Our US economists do not expect the Fed to raise rates this month, but even if wrong on the Fed call, we would not look for USD to break to new highs. We are looking for a dip in GBP/USD to re-establish the 1m/6m calendar spread.

FX Trading Tools: Economic Surprises & Risk Appetite

29 August 2016, **G10 FX Strategy**

ESI Trading Signals


The model is again slightly net short USD this week, with short positions against JPY and GBP partly offset by a long position against CAD. The US ESI rose slightly to -14 from -20. The RoW ESI slipped slightly to -7 (previously +1). The model was down 0.3% last week and is down 3.6% year-to-date.

ESI Trading Signals and Returns

Week:	26 Aug-2 Sep	19-26 Aug	12-19 Aug	5-12 Aug
EUR/USD	Neutral	Long	Long	Neutral
USD/JPY	Short @ 101.83	Short	Short	Short
GBP/USD	Long @ 1.3137	Long	Neutral	Neutral
USD/CAD	Long @ 1.3004	Long	Long	Long
AUD/USD	Neutral	Neutral	Short	Short
Weekly ESI Portfolio Return		0.1%	0.4%	-0.3%
YTD Return		-3.3%	-3.4%	-3.7%

Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Economic surprise indices – US vs RoW



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Comments on ESIs


		Comment
US	-14	Stronger durables and home sales
Eurozone	-7	Weaker M3 and German/French confidence
UK	14	No significant data released
Japan	43	No significant data released
Canada	-43	No significant data released
Australia	-43	No significant data released

Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

RAT


The RAT jumped in a risk-averse direction last week though it remained outright risk-seeking. The main drivers were equity and FX vol. VIX was up 2.8pts to 13.7 while the ECB's global hazard index—a blend of 1m implied vol in EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and EUR/JPY—was up 2.3pts to 14.0. Corporate spreads were unchanged at 93bps and EM spreads were 3bps tighter at 354bps.

RAT vs. AUD/JPY



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Contributions to RAT – index points



Source: RBC Capital Markets, Bloomberg

Economic Events Calendar

2 September 2016

Region	Time			Period	Data/Event	RBC	Consensus	Prior
	EDT	BST	AEST					
Mon 5								
Australia	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Q2	Nonfarm inventories, company profits q/q (%)	0.1, 2.0		0.4, -4.7
China	21:45+	2:45	11:45	Aug	PMI: services, composite index			51.7, 51.9
Spain	3:15	8:15	17:15	Aug	PMI: services, composite index	...,54.2		54.1, 53.7
Italy	3:45	8:45	17:45	Aug	PMI: services, composite index	...,51.7		52.0, 52.2
France	3:50	8:50	17:50	Aug	PMI: services, composite index ('flash': 52.0, 51.6)	52.0, 51.6		50.5, 50.1
Germany	3:55	8:55	17:55	Aug	PMI: services, composite index ('flash': 53.3, 54.4)	53.3, 54.4		54.4, 55.3
Euro area	4:00	9:00	18:00	Aug	PMI: services, composite index ('flash': 53.1, 53.3)	53.1, 53.3		52.9, 53.2
UK	4:30	9:30	18:30	Aug	PMI: services, composite index	49.5, ...		47.4, 47.5
Euro area	4:30	9:30	18:30	Sept	Sentix investor confidence index			4.2
Euro area	5:00	10:00	19:00	Jul	Retail sales m/m (%)	0.9		0.0
Tue 6								
Australia	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Q2	Current account (A\$bn), net exports (ppt contr to GDP)	-19.3, 0.3		-21, 1.1
Australia	0:30	5:30	14:30	...	RBA cash rate announcement	1.50	1.50	1.50
Germany	2:00	7:00	16:00	Jul	Factory orders m/m (%)			-0.4
UK	4:00	9:00	18:00	Aug	New car registrations y/y (%)			0.1
Germany	4:00	9:00	18:00	...	Finance Minister Schaeuble to present Budget to Parliament			
Euro area	5:00	10:00	19:00	Q2	GDP q/q, y/y (%) (previous est: 0.3, 1.6)	0.3, 1.6		0.6, 1.7
US	10:00	15:00	0:00#	Aug	ISM non-manufacturing	54.5	55.3	55.5
Wed 7								
Australia	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Q2	GDP q/q y/y (%)	0.4, 3.2		1.1, 3.1
Germany	2:00	7:00	16:00	Jul	Industrial production m/m (%)			0.8
France	2:45	7:45	16:45	Jul	Trade balance (€mn)			-3440
France	2:45	7:45	16:45	Jul	Current account, sa (€bn)			-0.6
UK	3:30	8:30	17:30	Aug	Halifax House Prices, m/m (%)			-1
Sweden	3:30	8:30	17:30	Sept	Riksbank interest rate decision (%)			-0.5
UK	4:30	9:30	18:30	Jul	Industrial production m/m (%)			0.1
UK	5:15	10:15	19:15	...	BoE's Cunliffe Speaks at Brugel event in Brussels			
UK	9:15	14:15	23:15	...	BoE's Carney, Cunliffe, Forbes and McCafferty to appear before Treasury Select Committee			
UK	10:00	15:00	0:00#	Aug	NIESR GDP estimate 3m/3m (%)			0.3
Canada	10:00	15:00	0:00#	...	BoC Rate Decision (%)	0.50	0.50	0.50
Canada	10:00	15:00	0:00#	Aug	Ivey PMI			57.0

Continued...

Continued

Region	Time			Period	Data/Event	RBC	Consensus	Prior
	EDT	BST	AEST					
Thu 8								
Australia	18:55+	23:55+	8:55	...	RBA's Lowe speaks			
Japan	19:50+	0:50	9:50	Jul	Current account (JPYbn)			974
Japan	19:50+	0:50	9:50	Q2	GDP q/q (%) (2nd estimate)			0.0
Australia	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Jul	Trade balance (A\$bn)	-2.8		-3.2
China	22:00+	3:00	12:00	Aug	Trade balance (US\$bn), imports, exports y/y (%)			52.3, -12.5, -4.4
France	1:30	6:30	15:30	Q2	Non-farm payrolls q/q (%)			0.2
France	2:30	7:30	16:30	Aug	BdF business sentiment index			98
Euro area	7:45	12:45	21:45	...	ECB Governing Council decision: refi rate, deposit rate (%)	0.0, -0.4		0.0, -0.4
Euro area	8:30	13:30	22:30	...	ECB President Draghi holds press conference			
Canada	8:30	13:30	22:30	Q2	Capacity Utilization Rate (%)			81.4
Canada	8:30	13:30	22:30	Jul	New Housing Price Index y/y (%)			2.5
Canada	8:30	13:30	22:30	Jul	Building Permits m/m (%)			-5.5
US	8:30	13:30	22:30	03-Sep	Initial jobless claims (K)	260		263
Canada	12:05	17:05	2:05#	...	BoC Deputy Chair Lane speaks			
Fri 9								
China	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Aug	CPI y/y (%)			1.8
Australia	21:30+	2:30	11:30	Jul	Housing finance m/m (%)	-3.0		1.2
Germany	2:00	7:00	16:00	Jul	Trade balance (€bn)			24.7
Germany	2:00	7:00	16:00	Jul	Current account (€bn)			26.3
France	2:45	7:45	16:45	Jul	Budget balance, ytd (€bn)			-61.8
France	2:45	7:45	16:45	Jul	Industrial production m/m (%)			-0.8
Spain	3:00	8:00	17:00	Jul	Industrial production m/m (%)			0.2
UK	4:30	9:30	18:30	Jul	Trade balance: total, visible (€mn)			-5084, -12409
UK	4:30	9:30	18:30	Jul	Construction output m/m (%)			-0.9
Canada	8:15	13:15	22:15	Aug	Housing Starts m/m (K)	182.0		195.0
Canada	8:30	13:30	22:30	Aug	Unemployment Rate (%), Net Change in Employment m/m (K)	6.9, 18.0		6.9, -31.2
Finland		Sovereign debt rating - DBRS			AAA, Stable

* Variable release date, # Following day, + Previous day

Sources: Bloomberg, Reuters and RBC Capital Markets estimates

RBC FX Forecasts

	2016			
Spot Forecasts	Q1	Q2	Q3f	Q4f
EUR/USD	1.14	1.11	1.05	1.03
USD/JPY	113	103	99	97
GBP/USD	1.44	1.33	1.25	1.21
USD/CHF	0.96	0.98	1.03	1.05
USD/SEK	8.12	8.46	8.86	8.83
USD/NOK	8.27	8.36	8.67	8.74
USD/CAD	1.30	1.29	1.36	1.33
AUD/USD	0.77	0.75	0.72	0.69
NZD/USD	0.69	0.71	0.69	0.65
USD/CNY	6.45	6.64	6.90	6.95
USD/CNH	6.46	6.67	6.93	6.98
USD/HKD	7.76	7.76	7.75	7.75
USD/INR	66	68	70	71
USD/KRW	1145	1153	1230	1250
USD/SGD	1.35	1.35	1.40	1.45
USD/MYR	3.88	3.99	4.20	4.40
USD/IDR	13148	13173	13700	13900
USD/TWD	32	32	36	37
USD/THB	35.1	35.1	38.8	39.8
USD/PHP	45.9	47.1	48.6	48.9
USD/TRY	2.82	2.88	3.40	3.20
USD/RUB	67	64	65	66
USD/ZAR	14.77	14.74	17.50	17.00
USD/PLN	3.73	3.94	4.19	4.22
USD/HUF	276	284	299	303
USD/CZK	23.8	24.4	25.7	26.2

	2017			
Spot Forecasts	Q1f	Q2f	Q3f	Q4f
EUR/USD	0.99	1.02	1.03	1.04
USD/JPY	95	92	95	97
GBP/USD	1.15	1.19	1.20	1.21
USD/CHF	1.08	1.06	1.06	1.07
USD/SEK	8.99	8.53	8.45	8.37
USD/NOK	8.99	8.63	8.45	8.27
USD/CAD	1.31	1.31	1.30	1.30
AUD/USD	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.68
NZD/USD	0.62	0.58	0.59	0.60
USD/CNY	7.00	7.20	7.40	7.50
USD/CNH	7.03	7.23	7.43	7.53
USD/HKD	7.75	7.75	7.75	7.75
USD/INR	71	72	72	73
USD/KRW	1270	1310	1290	1280
USD/SGD	1.50	1.60	1.58	1.56
USD/MYR	4.50	4.60	4.70	4.70
USD/IDR	14100	14300	14500	14700
USD/TWD	37	37	38	38
USD/THB	40.0	40.3	40.6	41.0
USD/PHP	49.4	49.3	49.2	49.0
USD/TRY	3.14	3.18	3.22	3.26
USD/RUB	67	69	68	67
USD/ZAR	16.80	16.50	16.50	16.50
USD/PLN	4.34	4.17	4.08	4.04
USD/HUF	313	302	297	294
USD/CZK	27.3	26.2	25.5	25.0

	2016			
EUR Crosses	Q1	Q2	Q3f	Q4f
EUR/USD	1.14	1.11	1.05	1.03
EUR/JPY	128	115	104	100
EUR/GBP	0.79	0.83	0.84	0.85
EUR/CHF	1.09	1.08	1.08	1.08
EUR/SEK	9.24	9.39	9.30	9.10
EUR/NOK	9.41	9.28	9.10	9.00
EUR/CAD	1.48	1.43	1.43	1.37
EUR/AUD	1.49	1.49	1.46	1.49
EUR/NZD	1.65	1.56	1.52	1.58
EUR/CNY	7.34	7.37	7.25	7.16
EUR/CNH	7.13	7.36	7.41	7.28
EUR/HKD	8.83	8.61	8.14	7.98
EUR/INR	75	75	73	73
EUR/KRW	1303	1280	1292	1288
EUR/SGD	1.53	1.50	1.47	1.49
EUR/MYR	4.42	4.43	4.41	4.53
EUR/IDR	14962	14626	14385	14317
EUR/TWD	37	36	38	38
EUR/THB	40.0	39.0	40.7	41.0
EUR/PHP	52.3	52.3	51.0	50.4
EUR/RUB	76.2	71.0	68.3	68.0
EUR/PLN	4.24	4.38	4.40	4.35
EUR/HUF	314	316	314	312
EUR/CZK	27.0	27.1	27.0	27.0

	2017			
EUR Crosses	Q1f	Q2f	Q3f	Q4f
EUR/USD	0.99	1.02	1.03	1.04
EUR/JPY	94	94	98	101
EUR/GBP	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86
EUR/CHF	1.07	1.08	1.09	1.11
EUR/SEK	8.90	8.70	8.70	8.70
EUR/NOK	8.90	8.80	8.70	8.60
EUR/CAD	1.30	1.34	1.34	1.35
EUR/AUD	1.50	1.55	1.54	1.53
EUR/NZD	1.60	1.76	1.75	1.73
EUR/CNY	6.93	7.34	7.62	7.80
EUR/CNH	7.19	6.96	7.37	7.65
EUR/HKD	7.67	7.91	7.98	8.06
EUR/INR	70	73	74	76
EUR/KRW	1257	1336	1329	1331
EUR/SGD	1.49	1.63	1.63	1.62
EUR/MYR	4.46	4.69	4.84	4.89
EUR/IDR	13959	14586	14935	15288
EUR/TWD	37	38	39	39
EUR/THB	39.6	41.1	41.8	42.6
EUR/PHP	48.9	50.3	50.7	51.0
EUR/RUB	66.3	70.4	70.0	69.7
EUR/PLN	4.30	4.25	4.20	4.20
EUR/HUF	310	308	306	306
EUR/CZK	27.0	26.7	26.3	26.0

Source: RBC Capital Markets estimates

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